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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ELLA H. BEEZLEY,

Plaintiff,
-vs.WILLIAM L. BEEZLEY,
Defendant.
-vs.-

Case No. 8411

ELIAS HANSEN,
Third Party Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

RESTATEMENT OF CASE
In the Brief of the defendant, William L. Beezley,
there is what is designated as a Statement of Facts which
is a mere statement of that part of the testimony of Mr.
Beezley when viewed in a light most favorable to him.
For the Court to get a proper understanding of the case,
it is necessary, at the outset, to give a brief summary
of the evidence received. Numerous ple.adings and motions were filed in the cause, but as the appellant makes
no claim that error was committed in the rulings made
thereon, no useful purpose will be served by a discussion
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of the pleadings. Suffice it to say that the action was
commenced on May 8 1952 but was not tried until April
' until July 26, 1955. Much
19, 1954 and w.as not' decided
of the delay was caused by stipulations of the parties as
well as by numerous motions and amended pleadings.
The action is founded on the claim of the plaintiff that
the defendant was guilty of cruelty causing gre.at mental
distress to the plaintiff.
Elias Hansen was made a third party defendant.
The relief sought against him was for an accounting of
the rents and profits made in the operation of the property at 150 South 7th East. The action as to him was
dismissed no cause of action. No complaint is made by
appellant as to such ruling.
In none of the pleadings filed by William L. Beezley
did he pray judgment th.at plaintiff be denied a decree of
divorce. In his pleadings he sought judgment that he be
awarded a one-half of the interest of the plaintiff in and
to the property located at 150 South 7th East. As heretofore stated, defendant has apparently referred to the
evidence upon which he relies for the relief prayed for by
him, but has not given the Court any information as to
plaintiff's evidence.
The following is a summary of the evidence offered
on behalf of the plaintiff:
Sarah Careman Martin in substance testified: That
she resided in the El Vigo Apartn1ents at 150 South
7th East, in Salt Lake City, for nine years and about
eight months. She Inoved to Garfield last July. That
while she resided in the El Vigo Apartments she occupied
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an apartment on the third floor immediately above the
apartment occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Beezley. Elias
Hansen after the de.ath of his wife occupied the apartment immediately above that occupied by the Martins.
(Tr. 10 - R. 107.) (In the course of this brief we shall
refer to the pages of the transcript because that is the
page shown in the index to the transcript.) That the
bedroom occupied by the Martins was just above the
bedroom occupied by the Beezleys. That Mr. Beezley
would come in late .at night and he seemed to always be
so quarrelsome and he seemed to always have it in for
Mrs. Beezley. I can truthfully say I have never heard
such vile language, such cursing and carrying on as I
heard from him, and he used to keep us aw.ake from two
to three o'clock in the morning. At first such actions
occurred around the weekends. As time went on, it seemed to be two or three times a week. That his actions
grew worse as time went on. That during "the last three
or four months he was there it was unbearable. I don't
know how Mrs. Beezley ever stood it. She used to come
up the next morning and apologize, she knew we had
been disturbed, she c.ame up and apologized. She felt
terrible about it." To the question, "To your knowledge,
was anybody else disturbed," she answered: "I heard a
great number in the apartment at that time, you know,
wonder how she could put up with it." I would see him
several times when he would be coming in the apartment,
be in front of the building, and he would come home in
a taxi and I would see the t.axi driver help him in the
apartment. He was unable to walk himself (Tr. 11).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
"One night about ten o'clock at night (he came to
the witness' apartment) he rang the door bell, we were
asleep and by the time I got to the door, I thought he
was going to break it down, he was hammering so hard
and I put the chain on it. I didn't know who it was. He
said: 'I want my wife.' I said: 'She isn't here.' He said:
'I want my wife.' I said: 'She isn't here.' He said: 'I
want my wife.' I said: 'She isn't here.' He said: 'I want
my wife.' And I thought he thought he was up to Judge
Hansen's apartment. I finally closed the door in his face
and finally heard him stumble downstairs, he was so
drunk he could hardly walk; he came to my apartment
twice. That at times it sounded like he was shoving things
around in the kitchen and bedroom, and sometimes I
guess, it would be when he would fall, it would almost jar
the building and I could hear ~Irs. Beezley trying to quiet
him down, keep him quiet." That during the period from
1945 to 1953 the witness never saw Mrs. Beezley inebriated. That the witness never saw Mr. Beezley do any
manual work about the apartment house, not even water
the lawn (Tr. 12). 1\frs. Beezley did it continually. He
did nothing about renting the .apartments or collecting
the rent, that was done by ~frs. Beezley. That ~Ir.
Hansen dug out a cellarway to make room for lockers,
and did some painting. That the witness ne\er saw Mr.
Beezley do any painting; "that outside of cursing and
swearing I heard him (defendant) accuse her (plaintiff)
one time she was stepping out, because she had come home
from a picture show."
On cross-examination she testified that she had not
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gone over her testimony with Mrs. Beezley but that she
talked with Mr. Iverson a few minutes this morning.
That the witness knew nothing about Mr. Beezley claiming any interest in the apartment. That when the apartment house was purchased, Mr. and Mrs. Beezley came
to the witness' .apartment and stated that Mrs. Beezley
and her father were purchasing the apartment and wanted to know if the Martins were willing to move out of the
apartment that they were occupying (Tr. 14). That during the time the witness lived at the El Vigo Apartment
a caretaker did the janitor work, but not the cleaning of
the .apartment (Tr.15). That during the time the witness
lived at the apartment the papering was done by paperhangers but Mrs. Beezley did most of the painting. That
the witness could not hear noises from the apartments
across the hall. That at one time she heard disturbances
in the basement (Tr. 16). That some people came in a
car about daylight and a man's wife was there and going
to kill someone. They were out on the sidewalk; that the
witness heard Mrs. Beezley at times talk loud when she
tried to quiet Mr. Beezley (Tr. 17). That the witness did
not move out of the apartment she was occupying because
Mrs. Beezley w.as so nice to us and she liked her apartment and didn't want to tell Mrs. Beezley that they were
moving out because her husband caused so much disturbance.
Ella H. Beezley testified in substance as follows:
That she is the plaintiff in this action and a daughter
of Judge Hansen, who is also a defendant. That before
her marriage, she taught school and saved a little more
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than $1000.00 which she loaned to her father just before
her marriage ; that she has resided in Salt Lake City
ever since her marriage; that when she was first married
she and her husband got along fine; that when first
married she and her husband fixed up the amusement
room in her father's and mother's home where they
lived (Tr. 19). They lived there about a year and did not
pay any rent. They then purchased .a home on Harrison
A venue for $2700.00 with a down payment of $250.00 and
the balance at the rate of $30.00 per month. That she
told her father that she and her husband were buying
a home and asked him for the .amount of the down payment of $250.00, which he paid to her by a check for that
amount. That as the monthly payments became due, the
father of the witness gave her a check which she in turn
gave to Mr. Beezley to pay on the purchase price of the
home. That they lived in the Harrison ~.\venue home for
about two years (Tr. 20). That they ran out of money
and were unable to make the payments on the home and
moved back to the home of the witness' parents. That
they continued to reside with plaintiff's parents for about
a year .and a half or two years and rented the Harrison
A venue home and used the money reserved for rent to
make the payments on the Harrison A venue property.
That after they left the h01ne of plaintiff's parents, they
separated for a time and becmne reconciled. Defendant's
drinking entered into the reason for the separation. That
the witness was operated upon and her father paid for
the same. That they moved back to Harrison A venue
and within four months thereafter the defendant began
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drinking again. They remained in the Harrison A venue
home for about a year (Tr. 21). That the witness saw
that they were about to lose the Harrison A venue property and the witness found it difficult to get a job as a
teacher and the witness sought the aid of her f.ather to get
money to purchase some income property. That the witness and Mr. Beezley traded some canyon lots on the
purchase price of a home on 9th Avenue. That the witness and her father purchased a home on 6th East and
soon there.after sold the same for a profit. That thereafter the witness purchased the Monteray Apartments
on 7th South and used $200.00 of the profit she made on
the 6th East property as her share of the down payment.
That she told her father at the time of the purchase of
the property on 7th South that .a profit was made on the
purchase and sale of the 6th East property and asked her
father to go in with her on the purchase of the 7th South
property. That the 7th South property was purchased,
the down payment being $5000.00, of which amount
$200.00 was p.aid by the witness and $4800.00 by her
father; that $4000.00 of the payment made by the witness' father was secured by a note and mortgage given
by the parents of the witness (Tr. 22). That the purchase
price of the 7th South property was $12,500.00. That in
order to raise sufficient money to pay for the property
on 7th South, it was necessary to give Tr:acy's a mortgage
for $7000.00. That to get the loan, Tracy's requested that
Mr. Beezley sign the note and mortgage. That Mr.
Beezley objected to signing the note and mortgage, that
the witness was anxious to have Mr. Beezley sign the
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note and mortgage, so that they could save the Harrison
home by renting it. That Mr. Beezley did sign the note
and mortgage; that he did not claim any interest in the
property on 7th South when he signed the note and mortgage. That the witness made payments to Tracys of
about $70.00 per month (Tr. 23); that the property on
7th South was run down .and the witness was unable to
keep up the payments from the income derived from the
property and was compelled to borrow money from her
father to keep up the payments. That the money borrowed was in addition to the down payment of $4800.00;
that the witness could not have payed for the property
without borrowing money from her father. That at the
beginning the witness felt she could pay for the property
on 7th South and gave her father a mortgage for $9500.00,
the same being the amount he had put into the property.
In 1945 the witness and her father purchased the 7th
East property known as the El Vigo. That the witness
did not have enough money to make her one-half of the
down payment (Tr. 24). That the price paid for the El
Vigo was $65,000.00 of which $19,500.00 was the down
p.ay1nent; that the ~Ionteray apartment was sold for
$27,000.00; that the witness' father had a mortgage for
$9,500.00; that the share of the witness in the money received from the ~1onteray aparbnent was $8500.00; that
the deed to the apartn1ent on 7th East was given to the
parents of the witness who in turn conveyed an undivided
one-half interest therein to the witness. That since the
purchase of the apartment on 7th East known as the El
Vigo the witness has operated the apartment; that the
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witness gets paid $70.00 per month and the use of an
apartment. Her father pays $70.00 per month rent for
his apartment. That Mr. Beezley has not had anything
to do with the operation of the El Vigo apartment; that
he claimed no interest therein prior to July 17, 1953.
He claimed no interest in the Monteray apartment, but
complained because of being required to sign the note
and mortgage (Tr. 26). That the Harrison Ave. property
was sold in about 1946. They received about $5000.00
cash from the sale which was used to purchase the property on 9th South which Mr. Beezley now calls the El
Dumpo property. It consists of four apartments. That
Mr. Beezley has collected the rents from the El Dumpo
property and has managed the same (Tr. 27).
That during the last three years living with him
(Mr. Beezley) has been almost intolerable. It has injured
my health and I went to the hospital soon after the suit
was filed. That the tenants in the apartment came to the
witness and asked her to have him put in an asylum. The
witness asked him to move out and see if they could work
things out, but he refused to do so. That when he, defendant, came home late at night he used vile and obscene
language. It was various embarrassing names such as
whore and bitch; he used s____ of a B ________ almost every
other word, until the language was humiliating and degrading to the extent it was a danger to my health, and
I could hardly stand to face the tenants the next morning,
I was so humiliated. He yelled very loud. I tried to stop
the yelling and many, many times I would go to a show at
night so he couldn't say things to me and sometimes when
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I would get home, sometimes he would continue all night
long. The last three months before the separation it (his
behavior) came at least every other night, as often as
every other night I could expect it-in fact about five
o'clock at night I would get right sick to my stomach
knowing this awful thing I would have to go through,
and sometimes he wouldn't go to bed at all. There is
absolutely no truth to the statement that the witness was
coerced into bringing her suit for a divorce by her father
(Tr. 29). Not only would he blaspheme me, but my father
and dead mother, which was upsetting to me. That in
about 1940 the witness and his brother, while drinking
to excess came to the Monteray apartment and started
harassing the witness, she did not risk calling the police
and she called her father if he would come by and stop
this terrible language and terrible goings-on; that she
never called the police; that to do so she feared would
only make things worse ( Tr. 30). That the witness' father
had nothing to do with the witness securing an order
restraining the defendant from going to the apartment
( Tr. 29). That before the restraining order was dismissed, the defendant agreed to refrain from going to the El
Vigo apartment; that quite a while after the suit was
commenced, the defendant called upon this witness and
stated that he w.as sorry for what he had done and he
was going to quit; that the witness replied that if they
could work something out, be happy and congenial she
was willing; that she took a course on alcoholism feeling
that maybe she could learn son1ething to solve their problem, and that a reconciliation might be had if he would
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try to overcome this habit and violence. That the witness
went down to the El Dumpo apartment and helped the
defendant paint and fix up his apartment (Tr. 30).
That at times she stayed with him at night and cohabitated with him for a period of about a year; that she went
to the AA meeting with him, but she was unwilling to take
him back to the apartment because she was afraid of his
drinking habit. That she suggested that they purchase
some more property in connection with the property on
9th South and live there; that she would come down there
to live; that she would continue to manage the El Vigo
apartment, collect all rents and use the money to buy a
car and help out (Tr. 31). To that suggestion the defendant said, "that isn't the way I will do it. If you will ask
your father to leave we will go back to the apartment and
you will give me half of your equity." To which the
plaintiff responded, "That is no use, if that is your attitude. I want to see if we can work out a marriage and I
have worked so hard to work out a security. If you pull
the security out from under me, I will have to put up with
hell and drink and lose my security and he would have a
foothold over me. More or less over a barrel. I said, "If
that is what you are interested in rather than making
up, there is no use trying," and I have had nothing to
do with him after that. He wanted to go back and I said
if you are going in for the drink and it is more than father
could stand, the vile language and the tenants had come
to my father and made complaint to him and I s.aid it is
more than I can stand and I don't think he would appreciate us going back to the apartment. If we will live
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away from there I thought it would be better. My father
didn't mind if he didn't drink and carry on, he didn't
want that and I didn't want it (Tr. 32). The next day
after the conversation on July 16th or 17th, 1953 he
(defendant) served me with papers, and when I entered
into this condonance I asked him if he would keep it quiet,
not use it against me, I thought a person didn't want it
brought out in court. He said he would. The language
he used in the papers served upon me used language
stronger than I thought needed-I thought all the cohabitation stuff was crude and unjust. He was determined
to get one-half of the interest of the plaintiff in the apartment; that she said that if that is the way you are going
to be, I don't see how we can reconcile ( Tr. 33). That
he served a lot of papers on me from time to time and
sued my father for $50,000.00, which I thought was ridiculous, which made me think he wasn't sincere. He was
more concerned about getting publicity and it was the
drink problem that was causing us not to get together.
That when my deposition was taken they kept going over
and over again the fact that we had eohabitated. I
thought that is personal and he pronlised not to go into
that (Tr. 34). In this connection the attention of the
Court is directed to the deposition of the plaintiff which
was received in evidence, and to pages 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 20,
21, 38, 39, 40, 42, 47, 48, 70 and 71. Defendant and his
counsel continued to interrogate the witness about the
intercourse, and when .and how many tiines it occurred
until counsel for :.Mrs. Beezley advised her not to answer.
See deposition of plaintiff, page 71.
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Returning to the transcript, 1frs. Beezley further
testified that the conversations had with Mr. Beezley on
July 16th and 17th caused her to be terribly upset.
It was the most confusing and harassing thing I ever
had in our home life. When I said overcome the drink
problem, he said that is ,a small part, I want your property. I want security. I felt this, if he got half of my
property and we went back together and he started drinking, I would have to put up with it the rest of my life or
lose security. That after the El Vigo apartn1ent was purchased the witness' father put an additional $33,000.00
for g.arages, buying new furniture and paying off part
of mortgage (R. 35). That there is still owing on the
mortgage on the property about $5300.00, about $2700.00
from conversion to gas, $200.00 for furniture and various
bills. (The amount owing for furniture was later corrected to be $2700.00.) (Tr. 62) That since the El Vigo was
purchased the witness and her father have regularly
made out partnership returns on the El Vigo. The witness and 1\fr. Beezley never filed a partnership return.
That J\!Ir. Beezley wrote the letter, Plaintiff's proposed
Exhibit One, during the time the witness and her husband
were attempting to effect a reconciliation (Tr. 36). Defendant objected to the admission of the letter because
of being against public policy. The court took the matter
of its admission under .advisement. The letter is dated
September 5, 1952 and provides that in consideration of
Mrs. Beezley granting an extension of time to December
15, 1952 for Mr. Beezley to plead that he, Mr. Beezley will
consent that Mrs. Beezley get a divorce and that the
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defendant would give a quit claim deed to the plaintiff
to the 7th East property and the plaintiff would give to
the defendant a quit claim deed to the 9th South property (Tr. 37). That all of the money the witness' father
owed her some $1200.00 or $1500.00 was paid on the
Harrison Ave. property. The money was paid to the witness with checks by her father and endorsed by the witness and given to the defendant who paid Durtschi, the
one selling the property (Tr. 39-41). That when the
Harrison Ave. property was sold, the money was used
to purchase the property on 9th South and the title placed
in their joint names (Tr. 42). That the witness paid
$200.00 and her father $4800.00 on the down payment on
the purchase price of the ~Ionteray or 7th South property (Tr. 43). That Mr. Beezley did some work such as
watering and cutting the lawn and carrying out the garbage. That during the time that the Beezleys were living
in the Monteray apartment a club known as the Salt Lake
Beautification Association was formed by a Mrs. Lund
and .a :Mr. Brewster and the .Beezleys were members and
~{r. Beezley was active in it ( Tr. 44). Its main purpose
was to stop the influx of colored and undesirable people,
and to keep up their pre1nises (Tr. ±5). That the organization was finally disorganized (Tr. 46). That at
the tiine Exhibit one was signed, the Beezleys were atteinpting .a reconciliation (Tr. 47). That the witness was
afraid of 1\Ir. Beezley and had experienced physical violence; that she dis1nissed the restraining order upon the
request of Mr. Beezley upon his prOinise that he would
not cause any disturbance (Tr. 49). That the plaintiff
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did everything she could to break the defendant from
drinking; it was his excessive drinking and the behavior
that went with the drinking that she objected to (Tr. 52).
That the witness joined the AA to get the defendant to
join. That the witness does not know whether the defendant has quit drinking, but has heard that he has (Tr. 53).
That the witness believes that the defendant was guilty
of fraud in entering into an arrangement for condonation because he said he would not go back together unless
the witness gave him a one-half interest in her property;
that she didn't think that the defendant could take away
property which she had secured with the aid of her
father (Tr. 54). That at times the defendant said he had
an interest in plaintiff's property and at other times he
said he did not. That the witness was willing to give
the defendant her interest in 9th South to get peace.
Usually a man gives a wife alimony, but in this case I
was willing to give that to him (Tr. 56). That in giving
him her interest in the 9th South property, she would
be giving him $7500.00 if the property is worth $15,000.00
as he claims; that the fact that the witness desired a quit
claim deed to the 7th East property does not necessarily
mean that the defendant had an interest in the same; that
the witness did not like these court cases (Tr. 57). That
the witness desired a reconciliation and to buy property
on 9th South, but the defendant said "No, I will not go
back together unless we move back to the El Vigo." (Tr.
58).
Elias Hansen was called as a witness and in substance testified as follows:
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That he is a member of the bar of the State of Utah;
that when Mr. and Mrs. Beezley were living in the Monteray apartments, Mrs. Beezley called the witness and informed him that her husband and Robert were raising
hell down there and asked him to come down and attempt
to do something about it. That he went down there and
met Oliver Olsen in the hall, who told the witness that
Robert and William were accusing Ella and Olsen of
having improper relations; that there was nothing to it
and they were just raising hell in there. That when the
witness went in, they were both drunk and Ella told the
witness what her trouble was and the witness told Mrs.
Beezley that she did not have to put up with this sort of
thing; that if she didn't want to she could come home
and live with us, or if it continues, break up your marriage with Bill (Tr. 71). Bill spoke up and said, "Don't
do that, don't do that." That is the only time the matter
of divorce was ever mentioned, until at about the time
she brought her suit. That the witness advised her that
he couldn't serve as her attorney; that perhaps the witness would be a witness, and if she deternlln.ed she and
Mr. Beezley couldn't get along, she would have to employ another attorney, but that the witness would from
time to time tell her what to do; that the witness knew
that his daughter and Mr. Beezley were having trouble
some months before she filed her action. That the witness
was living on the top floor in the ap.artinent house and
Martins were in between the witness and the apartment
occupied by the Beezleys. That particularly during the
two weeks next preceeding the tune the action for divorce
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was brought, when the witness went to bed at about
10:00 o'clock, his bedroom being directly over the
Beezleys, the witness heard Mr. Beezley at least every
other night carrying on down there, God-damning and
calling Mrs. Beezley a God-damned whore and things of
that sort; that kept up until about five o'clock in the
morning, then he would quiet down; that unfortunately
the witness did not interfere. That on three or four occasions Mr. Beezley came up to the apartment of the witness, which was on the top floor and asked if Ella was
there ( Tr. 71). That at least three times she was not,
and on one occasion, he, Mr. Beezley, said the witness
was a God-damned liar and started down stairs; that
the witness turned on the light and saw that Mrs. Beezley
had come in unknown to him and was lying on the couch
in the front room. On another occasion Mrs. Beezley called the witness down to her apartment ,and said that she
wanted something done with Bill; that the witness asked
why she, Mrs. Beezley, did not call the police, to which
she replied that she did not want to do that because to call
them would get this thing advertised. That when the witness went down to the Beezley apartment, Mr. Beezley
went into the bathroom and locked the door; that the
witness told Mrs. Beezley that she could come up and stay
with the witness to which Mrs. Beezley replied that she
was afraid that he would break up the furniture; that
when the witness returned to his apartment he heard
Mr. Beezley carrying on ashe had been.
That at the time the Monteray property was purchased, he told Mr. Beezley that in order to finance the
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deal and secure the money from Tracy Loan & Trnst
Company it was necessary for Mr. Beezley to sign the
note and mortgage with Mrs. Beezley (Tr. 72). That
Tracys stated that they wished Mr. Beezley to sign the
note and mortgage because he might make a claim of a
homestead if they lived there and it was contrary to their
practice to make a loan to a wife unless the husband
signed, particularly if they were going to occupy the
property; that the witness took the matter up with Mr.
Beezley, who s.aid that he didn't know why he should sign
the note and mortgage because he didn't own any of the
property. That the witness told Mr. Beezley that it was
up to him that if he didn't sign the deal would probably
blow up. So he signed under those circumstances. That
when the witness became involved in the deal for the purchase of the 7th South property that the witness told Mrs.
Beezley that he did not want to go into the apartment
house business, to which ~Irs. Beezley replied that she
had to make a living and that if the witness would help
her they could make a go of it. She had $200.00 growing
out of a purchase of the Swartz house in a probate proceeding which was immediately sold at a profit and Mrs.
Beezley had $200.00 left of her share of the profit which
she applied on the down payment on the 7th South property. The other $4800.00 of the down payment was made
by the witness (Tr. 73). That at the time the 7th South
property was purchased, the witness told the plaintiff
that if she and the defendant could pay for the property
they could have it .as the witness did not want to go into
the apartment house business. That a short time after the
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purchase, the plaintiff and defendant moved into the
7th South property. That later she said that she did not
think she could make a go of it at which time the witness
stated that he would go into .a partnership agreement
with her and see that the payments were made so that
she would not lose the money that they had put in the
property. That from time to time when she could not
meet the payments or needed money for other purposes,
the witness advanced the needed money. The property
was run down and considerable money was needed for
repairs and the purchase of new furniture. That when
the property on 7th East was purchased, the title was
taken in the name of the witness and his wife as joint
tenants. A down payment of $19,500.00 was made and a
mortgage for $45,500.00 was given on the property as the
balance of the purchase price. The plaintiff also signed
the note for the balance of the purchase price. The witness and his wife conveyed to the plaintiff an undivided
one-half interest in the property on 7th East known as
the El Vigo Apartments.
That beginning in 1945, the witness and his daughter, the plaintiff, made and filed partnership tax returns.
The first return included the profit made on the sale of
the Monteray Apartment. That partnership returns have
been filed every year since 1945 ( Tr. 74). That a written
memorandum of the partnership was executed upon
which is contained an annual settlement had by the witness and the plaintiff. Such memorandum was marked
Exhibit 2 and received in evidence. That the witness had
advanced a total sum of $35,502.34 in addition to the one-
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half of the $19,500.00 down payment (Tr. 75). Part of
the $35,502.34 so advanced was applied on the payment of
the rent on the .apartment which the witness occupied.
That in addition to the amount shown by the last account
on the memorandum of partnership agreement, the witness had advanced one check for $100.00, one check for
$250.00, one check for $500.00 and another check for
$600.00. The partnership pays the witness interest at
4% per .annum on the amount advanced by the witness
in excess of the amount advanced by the plaintiff. That
the witness was paying $75.00 a month rental on the
apartment occupied by him. That the property across the
street from the apartment where the garages are built
are a part of the property of the partnership. It is so
provided in the partnership memorandum. The land cost
$2000.00, building the garages cost $8500.00. All of the
money was paid by the witness. None of it came from the
income from the apartment (Tr. 76). That the witness
got back out of the $2000.00 a part of the taxes for the
year of the purchase. The owner paid the taxes for the
portion of the year that he owned the same. That along
in September 1953 I\Ir. Beezley came to the office of the
witness and told the witness that he and Mrs. Beezley
had been .attempting to affect a reconciliation, but they
were not getting anywhere because Mrs. Beezley didn't
want him back in the El Vigo apartn1ent. That the witness told I\fr. Beezley that if she wanted him to come
back there, the witness had no objection to his coming
back if he would behave himself and if Mrs. Beezley
wanted him back. I\Ir. Beezley s.aid that 1\frs. Beezley

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
wanted him to come down and stay down to the apartment
(on 9th South) or rent another place. The witness said,
"I think that is perhaps foolish if you can patch up your
difficulties." Then he, Mr. Beezley, began to talk about
another difficulty he had with respect to her conveying
to him one-half in the apartment house on 7th East.
The witness then said, "Bill, what right have you got
to that~" He said, "Well, I think I should have some
interest in it." He s.aid, "When we bought the house up
on Harrison Avenue that was put in their joint names and
that he made the payments on the property." (Tr. 77).
The witness said, "Now Bill, you know better than
that." He said, "No, I made all the payments." The
witness said no, he recalled when they were about to move
in there Ella came to the witness and said they were about
to buy a home on Harrison Ave. and asked the witness
whether or not he could pay her some money he was
owing her, the witness said, "Sure, at any time." That
at that time the witness advanced her a payment of
$250.00 and from month to month thereafter, Mrs. Beezley would come to the witness and ask for additional
money and the witness would give it to her. That the
witness said to the defendant that he, Mr. Hansen, was
owing his daughter something in excess of $1000.00 and
some interest and that if she did not use the money to pay
on the home what did she do with it, to which Mr. Beezley
replied that he did not know what she did with it. Defendant further said that one of the conditions of a
reconciliation was that he was to get an interest in the
apartment house on 7th East. The witness asked Mr.
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Beezley on what theory he could expect that, to which
he responded that he did some work down at the other
apartment and that l\1rs. Beezley had made no payments
on the Harrison Ave. property, and he was going to insist
on having half of her interest in the apartment on 7th
East. The witness said, "Bill, you have about as much
chance to get an interest in that property as I have to
fly to the moon." To which Mr. Beezley replied, "Well,
I can make a try for it."
That Mr. Beezley then started to tell the witness
about Mrs. Beezley. He said, "You think Ella is all good,
she has been drunk and I have had to take her home."
The witness said, "Bill, maybe you are right, I have never
seen her drunk or heard of her being drunk," and Mr.
Beezley then went on to tell (Tr. 78) the witness about
one time he came home and heard some voices in the
apartment where they were living; that before he was
able to get in she was gone; that she couldn't have gone
out of the apartment without some help; and he was sure
she was in there with some other fellow~ that at the time
of this conversation the witness told Mr. Beezley that
even if he succeeded in establishing an interest in the
aparbnent house the witness wouldn~t engage in the
apartment house business with him, that he couldn't trust
him; that he could break the1n financially if he (Beezley)
behaved as he had been. As l\Ir. Beezley left he said, "I
don't want to be in a partnership with you either." That
the witness informed l\1rs. Beezley of the above conversation with Mr. Beezley. That he never told Mrs. Beezley
that he would disown her if she went back to Bill· that

'
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he had observed the effect on Mrs. Beezley after she
broke off her attempted reconciliation with Mr. Beezley
(Tr. 79). That Mrs. Beezley was nervous and couldn't
talk about anything except what she had done for Mr.
Beezley and how he had reacted.
That the witness went up to Yellowstone Park soon
after the break up of the Beezleys; that Mrs. Beezley
went with him; that they were unable to get sep.arate
rooms, but compelled to get one room with two beds ;
that the only thing she could talk about was her troubles
with Bill and how he had tried to beat her out of her
property. At night she would wake up; she was all shot
to pieces. That in the opinion of the witness the El Vigo
apartment is worth $65,000.00 and the property across
the street was probably worth what it cost; that is $10,500.00; that the apartment and the garages were in the
witness' opinion worth $75,000.00 (Tr. 80). That is the
amount paid for the property and it has produced substantially five per cent net on the money invested.
Upon cross-examination, Elias Hansen in effect
testified that he thought his daughter's sights were too
high when she said that the property was worth $100,000.00. That since the witness and his daughter owned
the apartment they had an average of $45,000.00 of their
own money invested in the property and that the net income to them was maybe $2000.00 and that if that money
had been invested in stocks and bonds twice that income
would be received. That in making the income tax returns
there would be deducted from the gross returns the cost
of operation and the amount of interest paid on the
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mortgage. When this is done there is about $2000.00 left,
a little less than that last year when it was $1943.00 (Tr.
81).
That when the daughter of the witness and Mr.
Beezley were first married they lived at the home of
the witness and his wife for about a year and a half; that
they probably did that to save paying rent; they moved
from the home of the witness and his wife to the home
they purchased on Harrison A venue. That the money
the witness borrowed from his daughter was earned by
her teaching school at Panguitch and Minersville; that in
the witness' deposition he placed the amount owing his
daughter at between $1200 and $1500 (Tr. 82). That the
witness' best recollection is that he gave her a check to
make the down p.ayment of $250.00, but he may be in
error about the amount; that thereafter he made monthly
payments; that the payments were made by check which
were destroyed when he sold his home on 15th East;
that he did not see the checks turned over to apply on the
purchase of the Harrison Ave. property: that the money
owing l\frs. Beezley was all paid off wlrile she and Mr.
Beezley were occupying the Harrison Ave. property
(Tr. 84). That the purchase price of the Monteray apartment was $12,500.00 of which $5000.00 was the down payment; that as the witness recalls that property was sold
subject to the 1nortgage; that the seller took a second
mortgage on the balance of the purchase price; that later
the mortgage to Tracy Loan & Trust Company was increased so that all except about $300.00 of the purchase
price was p.aid the seller. Later on reduction was n1ade
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by the Seller on the $300.00 which had not been paid and
the $300.00 was paid off (Tr. 84). That Bill signed a
mortgage, but the witness did not think it was for $7500.00 ( Tr. 85). That when the property was sold, the purchaser, a ~Ir. Stringer, insisted on Mr. Beezley signing
the Deed because the Beezleys had been living in the
apartment. That .after Mrs. Beezley obtained a deed to
the property on 7th South she deeded a one-half interest
to the witness. The apartment on 7th South was sold for
$27,000.00 in 1945 ( Tr. 89). That out of the sale of the
property on 7th South there was a commission paid to the
real estate broker who made the sale, cost of bringing
the abstract down to d.ate, some recording fees and escrow fees, the witness took his portion of the sale in a
mortgage for $15,000.00. His daughter took all of her
share in cash (Tr. 90). That the witness purchased some
property immediately to the East of the property on 7th
South, primarily to prevent some building close to the
7th South property and thereby cutting of the light; that
the $9500.00 mortgage the witness held on the 7th South
property was released .and the amount thereof included
in the $15,000.00 which the witness took as his share for
the sale of that property.
In his brief the defendant has directed the attention
of the court to some portions of his testimony and that
of his witnesses. Apparently attention is there directed
to all of the evidence which appellant claims supports
or tends to support his position. Therefore, we shall direct the attention of the court to only those .additional
portions of the evidence of the defendant which we deem
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necessary for the court to consider in order to reach a
proper conclusion.
Mrs. Francis Carlson testified that from sometime
in November 1952 until July 1953 she saw Mrs. Beezley
helping to fix up the apartment occupied by Mr. Beezley
(Tr. 95). That she saw her car parked outside all night
( Tr. 96). Mrs. Jeanie Teresa Beezley Barney, a witness
called by the defendant, testified that she is a niece of the
defendant and lived with the Beezleys for some_ time
( Tr. 97). She testified that she heard the defendant say
that he was sorry that he had signed the note and mortgage in connection with the purchase of the Monteray
apartment (Tr. 79).
On cross-examination, Mr. Beezley testified that he
didn't know whether or not he discussed financial affairs
with Mrs. Beezley. He knew the Monteray apartment sold
for $27,000.00 (Tr. 180). That he asked for an accounting
from Mrs. Beezley after she filed a suit for a divorce.
He did not ask for an accounting on the Monteray prior
to the time the divorce suit was filed. That he did not
file a federal or state income tax return on the income
from the Monteray apartment (Tr. 180-181). That Mrs.
Beezley was taking care of the bookkeeping (Tr. 181.)
That he has never showed any income on his tax return
for either the Monteray or the El \ . .igo; that he did not
know about the $15,000.00 note taken by Mr. Hansen on
the Monteray until he took his deposition (Tr. 181).
That he made no payments on the notes that were given
as evidence of money owing on the Monteray apartment
except the payments made by Mrs. Beezley out of the
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income from that apartment house (Tr. 184). That the
Harrison property was rented for from $25.00 to $35.00
per month and $60.00 per month after it was fixed up (Tr.
184). That he did not know what part of the money received from the sale of the Monteray went into the purchase of the El Vigo apartment; that the witness did not
know anything about the deal until he was sued for a
divorce (Tr. 185). That the witness did not want to let
Mr. Hansen know about his agreement with Mrs. Beezley
in connection with the apartment houses (Tr. 187). That
the witness did not know anything about where the money
came from to pay for the property and the garages across
the street and did not care (Tr. 188).
Elias Hansen was rec.alled and identified 101 cancelled checks, all of which, except possibly one for $250.00
was paid for operating and applying on the purchase
price of the El Vigo Apartment house and were, in addition to the down payment on the apartment. Such
checks included the purchase of the property across the
street and the construction of the g.arages. (Tr. 196)
The total of the checks is $35,502.34 after deducting the
check of $250.00 which may have been paid to Mrs.
Beezley for her piano which was sold with the sale of
the witness' home. The cancelled checks were received
in evidence as Exhibit 29. That $8000.00 of the checks
was for the property across the street. (Tr. 197). Later
Mr. Hansen corrected his testimony about the $8000.00
spent across the street ,and stated that the $8000.00 was
for constructing the 14 garages and there was an additional $2000.00 for the purchase of the land. The pro-
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perty across the street is a part of the property covered
by the partnership agreement.
Mrs. Beezley was recalled and testified that when
she went to the hospital it was an emergency and that
she tried to contact Mr. Beezley but was not successful;
that she had no agreement with Mr. Beezley in connection with the Monteray apartment nor the El Vigo; that
her father advanced the money to enable her to purchase
the same (Tr. 202). She did say that if Mr. Beezley
would quit his drinking they could have a little more
security. That Mr. Beezley never asked the witness
for an accounting as to either the ~fonteray or the El
Vigo apartments prior to the divorce proceeding. (Tr.
203). That when the letter written by Mr. Beezley,
(Exhibit P-1) she did not say it was to show her father.
That the witness brought her action for divorce because
of the treatment by the defendant and because of his
defaming her character. That the witness never had
any marriage relations with Mr. Beezley after he
filed his counterclaim for a divorce (Tr. 204).
That the witness did not say her father would
disinherit her if she did not get a divorce or
that he had made a will; that she did not say that
l\'Ir. Beezley was a cripple outside of his drink habit;
He is not a cripple, he gets along fine. (Tr. 205). That
she did not know why the defendant and 1frs. Barney
should w:ant to defame her character; that ~Ir. Armstrong is a friend of the witness and was engaged to
marry a Mrs. Hunsaker; that she n1et him at the
apartment when she was on her way to meet ~irs. Bar-
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ney, the niece of the defendant, and Mr. Armstrong
said he would take the witness to see Mrs. Barney.
That he, Armstrong, further stated that he wished to
show Mrs. Barney his apartment. That Mr. Armstrong
took the niece out to dinner, that the niece was taking
medicine and became sick; that on the other occasion
testified to by the defendant, Mr. Armstrong came to
the apartment to visit a friend who w.as ill and Mrs.
Hunsaker came with him. That he left his overcoat
and a small drink in a bottle that the witness has never
kept company with Mr. Armstrong, that she never said
that she wanted the tenants to think she w.as being
beaten by Mr. Beezley. (Tr. 206).
In connection with our discussion of this phase
of the case, we direct the attention of the court to a
number of misstatements contained in appellant's brief:
Thus it is stated on page 16 of appellant's brief that
Elias Hansen stated that Tracy Loan & Trust Company
and Mr. Stringer wanted the Deed to Monteray apartments signed by Mr. Beezley by reason of a homestead
act, when the record shows that Tracy Loan & Trust had
been paid off some three years prior thereto. What
Elias H.ansen did testify to is this : I told him ( defendant) when Mrs. Beezley wanted to buy that property
(Monteray) we took it up with Tracy Loan & Trust
Company, and the Tracy Loan & Trust Company, p.articularly when the matter was refinanced, said they
would not make .a loan and the deal would not go through
unless Mr. Beezley signed the note and mortgage with
Mrs. Beezley; that they might claim a homestead if
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they lived there, and it was contrary to their practice
to make a loan to a wife unless the husband signed,
particularly if they were going to occupy the property.
(Tr. 72 & 73).
In the deposition taken in the cause (Tr. D-30) Mr.
Hansen testified that when the Monteray was sold to
Mr. Stringer he required Mr. and Mrs. Beezley to sign
the deed because they had been living in the apartment
and may claim a homestead the same as was done with
the mortgage. To construe the language found on page
12 of the deposition .to mean that Tracy Loan & Trust
Company requested the Beezleys to sign the Deed to
Stringer is wholly unwarranted. Of course, Tracy Loan
& Trust Company was not interested in the property
after the mortgage was paid off.
On page 15 of appellant's brief, it is s.aid that defendant was always claiming an interest in the property.
There is no such evidence in P 53 D, Ex 30. There is
some such language on page 53 where the plaintiff did
say that she was a darned fool when she agreed to
give Mr. Beezley .a deed to her interest in the apartment on 9th South, El Dumpo. (Deposition of plaintiff page 52-53) In connection with her deposition she
did say that he was always claiming he did have an
interest and she claimed he did not. If that sentence
is read in connection with the rest of her testimony, it
is clear that such claim applied only to the period when
the p.arties were having trouble about a divorce. (See
Tr. 55-56). It is argued that because Mr. Beezley had
made a claim to an interest in the El Vigo apartment
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before July 17, 1953 when the attempted reconciliation
was terminated, the plaintiff should not be offended
about such a demand being made by the defendant. In
the light of the fact that such demand was made after
the defendant, by a written agreement, had agreed to
give up any such claim and the fact that the demand
was accompanied by a demand that plaintiff's father
be required to vacate the apartment on 7th East would
make the demand even less justified than it would
otherwise have been.
On page 12 of appellant's brief is cited a portion of a letter written by plaintiff to defendant's sister.
It would seem from the letter that defendant's sister
was attempting to get the plaintiff and defendant to do
something towards the support of defendant's brother
Bob, and that the plaintiff was offering reasons why
they were unable to do so. To say that the language
there used indicated that the defendant had an interest
in the Monteray apartment is stretching the language
far beyond the breaking point. The fact that plaintiff's father was helping the Beezleys acquire a home
falls far short of indicating that the defendant had already acquired an interest in a home, quite the contrary. On page 18 of appellant's brief, reference is
made to the testimony of defendant's brother, Vernon.
Such evidence is found on pages 209 to 212 of the
Transcript. It may be noted that even the defendant
does not have the temerity to claim that he and his
wife ever owned the Monteray apartment. All he claims
is that he should be found to be the owner of one-half of
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plaintiff's interest therein. Moreover, I wonder what
the defendant would have said if the plaintiff had explained to his brother that defendant did not have any
interest in the property, but that the plaintiff was
furnishing a home for the defendant.
On being recalled, Mr. Beezley testified that he
inadvertently filed his counterclaim against Mrs. Beezley;
that he prepared the counterclaim long before it was
filed; that he got Judge Van Cott to take out the Counterclaim ; he signed the Counterclaim on July 17, 1953;
that he believed the Counterclaim was signed a short
time after the divorce Complaint was filed; that he
knew there was .a Counterclaim for his equity in the
apartment (Tr. 216) that the affidavit of service on
Mr. Iverson states that the Counterclaim had been filed;
that a Lis Pendens was also filed (Tr. 218).
Elias Hansen was called in rebuttal and testified
that Mr. Beezley in September 1953 did not say "I will
be seeing you," nor did he, Mr. Hansen say "I hope not
at the El Vigo."
The plaintiff was recalled and testified that she
kept the books of the apartments which were audited
twice a year by her and her father; that she had never
gone over her books of accounts as to the aparbnent
houses with Mr. Beezley, nor has he ever asked to see
the books. (Tr. 229, 230)
The deposition of Mrs. Beezley and Mr. Hansen were
received in evidence. In the main the evidence contained
therein is the same as that at the trial and therefore

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
we shall not abstract the same. The depositions are
marked Exhibit D 30 and 31.
Before taking up our argument, we digress to call
the attention of the court to the fact that no Designation of Record on Appeal was served upon counsel for
respondent as required by Rule 75a of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. However, there does appear in the
record a paper marked Designation and as having been
filed on August 25, 1955. While the "designation" is not
in conformity with the form suggested in Form 30 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we shall be content
by calling the matter to the attention of the Court.
ARGUMENT
It will be observed from appellant's Brief that he
relies upon three points. The respondent concedes that
Point No. 3 is well taken, but we observe that this was
not necess.ary to prosecute an appeal to accomplish what
it there sought. So far as .appears the defendant could
have conveyed a one-half interest in the property known
as El Dumpo situated at 171 East 9th South back to
the plaintiff without receiving an order so to do by this
Court. We shall discuss the other two points in the order
named.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE
EVIDENCE IN THIS CAUSE SHOWED THAT DEFENDANT
WAS GUILTY OF CRUELTY WHICH RENEWED THE
ORIGINAL GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE AS ALLEGED IN
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT
PERFORM THE MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS HE OWED TO
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THE PLAINTIFF BUT ON THE CONTRARY HIS CONDUCT
BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE ALLEGED RECONCILIATION ·CONSTITUTED CRUELTY ENTITLING THE PLAINTIFF TO A DIVORCE.

We have heretofore at some length in this Brief
directed the .attention of the Court to the acts of cruelty
testified to by the plaintiff, by Mrs. Martin, by Elias
Hansen and some of the evidence of the defendant and
his witnesses. Before summarizing such evidence, it
may be well to examine some of the authorities dealing
with the law question here presented.
The law with respect to under what circumstances
condonation ceases to be available as a defense has been
before the courts upon numerous occasions. This court
has comparatively recently announced the law upon that
matter in the case of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 236 Pac.
( 2d) 1066, not yet in the Utah reports where it is said:
"Where a spouse resumes misconduct subsequent to condonation by the other spouse, the
injured spouse in a divorce action can assert all
prior misconduct as well as that occuring subsequent to the condonation."
The Court cites in support of its opinion the cases
of Arnold v. Arnold, 75 Cal App (2d) 877; 174 Pac.
(2d) 674; Burt v. Burt, 48 Wyo. 19; -!1 Pac. (2d); Thum
v. Thum, 105 Colo. 352; 98 Pac. (2d) 279. A very full
collection of the cases dealing with this question will
be found in 32 A.L.R. (2d) 107. It would be a herculean
task to review all the cases there cited. "\Ye have read a
great number of them taken at random and find that
they support the law as stated in the text of the annotation.
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A1nong the principles of law stated are:
"A condonation is not as readily inferred
against a wife as against a husband." page 113
"It is commendable for an injured spouse to
continue cohabitation with a spouse who is commiting a series of cruel acts or indignations where
the injured spouse hopes that the other will mend
his ways and that the marriage may be saved
by patient forebearance, .and many cases hold that
such cohabitation does not constitute condonation where the conduct continues. It has also been
said that a wife's endurance of unkind treatment
in the hope that her husband will reform should
never be allowed to weaken her right to relief."
See page 131 of the above volume of A.L.R ..and
numerous cases there cited.
It is often said that a condonation is conditional or
that it is only conditional forgiveness. Page 161 of the
above volume of A.L.R. "It is obvious that the subsequent
misconduct which will avoid the effect of a condonation
of cruelty need not of itself be sufficient as a ground
for divorce, otherwise a divorce would be granted on the
ground of the subsequent conduct and there would be
little point in bothering with a determination as to
whether there has been a revocation of the condonation."
See 166 of the above Vol. of A.L.R. and cases cited from
numerous states in the support of the text.
We have taken the pains to take at random and read
a number of the cases cited in the above mentioned
volume of A.L.R. and the same are in accord with the
statement of the law above taken from the annotation.
The authorities generally are to the effect that con-
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donation blots out the offense condoned, so that any
act of condonation that is so blotted out is not available
by way of incrimination in a suit by the spouse whose
offense was condoned against the condoning spouse for
his or her subsequent misconduct. 17 Am. Jur. 272, Sec.
240 and cases cited in foot notes.
Following is a summary of the evidence which prevents defendant from defeating plaintiff's action for
a divorce because of the claim of condonation.
The plaintiff took a course at the University of
Utah as to what might be done to cure Mr. Beezley from
the drink habit. (Tr. 30) She prevailed upon him to
join Alcoholic Anonymous, but in order to get him to
join, he required her to join. (Tr. 31-53). Sometimes
after the action w.as brought the Beezleys, in a limited
way, resumed their marriage relations with the agreement that such resumption would not be used against
the plaintiff if they were unable to effect a permanent
reconciliation. (Deposition of Mrs. Beezley, Page 5)
Mr. Beezley denied any such agreement. The case was
continued from time to time upon the request of Mr.
Beezley and in order to get one of such continuance
he wrote the letter, Exhibit 1, wherein the defendant
agreed that he would not contest the granting of a divorce
and that Mrs. Beezley should have the property on 7th
East known as the El Vigo and defendant would have
the property on 9th South known as El Dumpo. After
the .attempted reconciliation, the defendant filed his
Answer and Counterclaim which he claims had been
prepared for some time and in which he sought a divorce
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from the plaintiff. In such counterclaim he charged
plaintiff with various acts of Inisconduct and sought to
acquire one-half of plaintiff's interest in the El Vigo;
that the immediate c.ause of the failure of the permanent
reconciliation was the demand that plaintiff deed onehalf of her interest in the El Vigo to the defendant
and get plaintiff's father removed therefrom. (Tr. 32-35)
Such demand was made notwithstanding a compliance
therewith was prob.ably impossible. That after the final
break up between the Beezleys and in September 1953,
the defendant went to the office of the plaintiff's father,
told him that a reconciliation could not be had between
him and his wife unless he was given a one-half interest
in the El Vigo apartment and also told the father of the
plaintiff that he had taken his daughter home drunk
and that when he came home one night his wife was in
the apartment house with some one; that he heard
voices; that when he got into the apartment she was
gone and that she could not have gotten out of the
apartment without assistance. (Tr. 78-79). That notwithstanding plaintiff's father informed the defendant
that he would dispose of the El Vigo apartment if defendant were to acquire an interest therein, the defendant continued in his attempt to acquire such an
interest, notwithstanding the income from that apartment was the sole source of the support of the plaintiff. That if there had been any doubt about the unwillingness of the plaintiff's father to be in a business to which
the defendant was interested, such doubt was obviously
removed by the $50,000.00 suit brought by the defendant
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against the plaintiff's father. To say that it was not
cruelty for the defendant to attempt to deprive plaintiff of her sole source of support by his flimsy claim of
having an interest in the El Vigo apartment is to ignore
the obvious.
That when the defendant and his attorney were
taking the deposition of the plaintiff, they took turns in
asking her about intercourse with the defendant, there
were at least 15 times such questions were asked notwithstanding they knew such questions were embarrassing; the last question asked the plaintiff was by the defendant who asked how many times she had had intercourse with him after the suit was brought. It was only
upon the advice of plaintiff's attorney that she refused
to answer that brought an end to such questions. Ex.
P-30 page 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 20, 21, 38, 39, 40, 42, 47, 48, 70, 7L
During the course of the trial, the defendant in
great detail testified to all of his real and imaginary
grievances; sought to make out a case of perjury against
plaintiff because of what she said in a case brought by
the Beezleys against certain officers of Salt Lake City.
While testimony there relied upon falls far short of being
perjury it ill becomes the defendant to make such a claim
if as the plaintiff testified her testimony in that ease was
given upon the advice of the defendant. See Exhibit
D-25 and Tr. 116 and 119.
The law is well settled that if a condonance is
brought about by fraud the one guilty of the fraud
vitiates the condonation. It is so held in a number of
the cases collected in 32 A.L.R. (2d) 107 supra. In light
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of the fact that the defendant sought and was granted
numerous continuances and the fact that in the letter
Exhibit P-1, the defendant agreed to give up all claim
to El Vigo apartment and the further fact that he is
here seeking a one-half of plaintiff's interest in the El
Vigo apartments indicate that defendant's primary concern during the period when the parties were apparently
attempting to bring about a condonation was to secure
plaintiff's property rather than to bring about a permanent reconciliation. The plaintiff so construed his
action. (Tr. 54)
It will be seen that in the evidence of defendant
he testified to all of his claimed grievances and the
claimed shortcomings of his wife. If as he contends
Mrs. Beezley condoned his acts it is indeed difficult to
understand why her acts were not condoned also, but
in his evidence and brief he claims that his own behavior
was condoned but not that of his wife. It is obvious that
to require the plaintiff to continue to be the wife of the
defendant would be doing her a grave injustice and that
the evidence is more than ample to support the findings,
conclusions and decree of the trial court awarding her a
divorce.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF HAD A PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT AS TO THE EL VIGO APARTMENT OR
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
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It may be noted at the outset that even if it were
true that plaintiff and defendant had an agreement as
to the El Vigo apartment, such fact would not justify
the awarding of any interest in that apartment to the
defendant. It is provided by U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-5 that
when a divorce is granted the court may make such
distribution of the property .as shall be reasonable and
proper. The evidence in this case shows these facts:
The El Vigo apartment was purchased in 1945 for the
sum of $65,000.00, of which amount $19,500.00 was paid
down and a mortgage given for the purchase price in
the sum of $45,500.00. (Tr. 74). A tract of land was
purchased across the street from the apartment and 14
garages built thereon at a cost of about $10,000.00. The
plaintiff's father had advanced the $10,000.00 for the
purchase of the land and building the garages, and an
additional sum of about $23,000.00 for buying new furniture, stoves, refrigerators and payments made by him
on the mortgage. (Tr. 35, 75 and Exhibit P-2 and P-29)
There was owing at the time of the trial $5300.00 on the
purchase money mortgage; $2700.00 on furniture (Tr.
62) and $2700.00 on conversion of the heating system to
gas. Thus the total indebtedness of the partnership at
the time of the trial was about $43,700.00 It had a net
income as shown by the partnership return of about
$2000.00 per year; the return for the year before the
trial was $1943.00. 1\Ir. Hansen placed the value of the
apartment and the land across the street at $75,000.00
which is the price paid. (Tr. 80). Thus after Mrs. Beezely
was paid her monthly allowances for operating the apart-
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ment there was very little remaining to apply on the
investment. In this connection it should be noted that
in the income tax returns no interest can be deducted
for interest paid a partner. In their pleadings the
Beezleys placed the value of the apartment at $100,000.00 and the court so found its value to be.
The defendant placed the value of the El Dumpo
apartment which was awarded to him at $15,000.00, the
money owing thereon at $158.47 and the monthly income
therefrom $200.00. (Tr. 131-132). The plaintiff has no
income except that which she receives from the apartment house which she operated. The defendant is an
attorney at law .and practicing his profession. His income is not shown by the evidence. It will thus be seen
that if the El Vigo apartment is worth $100,000.00 as
the court found and the indebtedness against it is $43,700.00, the net value would be $56,300.00 of which plaintiff's share would have a value of $28,150.00. The value
of the property on 7th East if fixed at the purchase
price and as testified to by Mr. Hansen, the equity of
the plaintiff after deducting the indebtedness would be
$15,650.00.
Obviously the value that may be placed on the
apartment house does not aid the plaintiff in making
a livelihood so long as she operates the same. It is
the means derived therefrom that is of primary concern
to one who relies on the income for support. With property producing only $2000.00 net a year, plaintiff will
do well to get along if her father is to be paid 4% interest
on the amount he has invested in excess of plaintiff's
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investment. The evidence shows without conflict that
defendant has made no p.ayment on either the Monteray
or the El Vigo apartment. The payments have all been
made by the plaintiff and her father. In such case the
presumption is that the person making the payments are
in equity the owners of the property paid for by them.
Anderson v. Coercone 54 Utah 345; 185 Pac. 586. The
only claim made by the defendant as to payments on the
Monteray apartment is that he signed a note with the
plaintiff for $3000.00 at the time the apartment was
purchased. (Ex. D-17) . Later that mortgage was released
(Ex. D-19). A new mortgage for $7000.00 was given
to take up the $3000.00 note and mortgage together with
a mortgage that was on the property when the purchase
was made by the plaintiff. (Ex. D-20 and D-21). Some
of the note and mortgage for $7000.00 w.as paid out of
the income derived from the operation of the Monteray
apartment, the balance was paid by plaintiff's father.
Defendant makes no claim to the contrary. (Tr. 183).
It is provided by U.C.A. 1953, 95-5-1 that an interest
in real est.ate must be established by an instrument in
writing or by operation of law. Among the Utah cases
holding that an interest in real estate must be shown
by a written instrument are: Price v. Lloyd 31 Utah 86;
86 Pac. 767; Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 575; 206
Pac. 262; Moffat v. Hoffntan, 61 Utah ±82; 214 Pac. 308.
So also an oral agreement to 1nake such a contract must
be in writing. Pau.l v. Layne etal, 9 Cal (2d) 561, 71
Pac. (2d) 817; Birdzcll l'. Utah Oil Refg. Co. 242 Pac.
(2d) 578; Collet v. Godrich, 231 Pac. (2d) 730; Hawaiian
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Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp. 207 Pac. (2d) 794.
Apparently appellant in his brief bases his claim to
an interest in the El Vigo apartment by operation of
law. An imposing array of cases is cited in his brief in
support of such claim. The difficulty with defendant's
claim in such p.articular is that the cited cases do not
support his position.
At the outset before one may successfully establish
a claim founded on an oral contract, it must be made
to appear that there is such a contract. Skeen v. Van
Sickle 80 Ut. 419; 425; 15 Pac. (2d) 344. It was testified
to by the defendant that he and the plaintiff agreed
to go into a partnership. The plaintiff denied that
there was any such agreement as to either the El Vigo
or Monteray apartment. In his testimony defendant
went into the purchase of the Harrison Ave. property,
the property on 9th A venue and the property on 9th
South, referred to as the El Dumpo. It does not follow
that bec.ause the plaintiff and defendant were jointly
interested in the above mentioned property that they
were jointly interested in either the Monteray or the
El Vigo apartments, indeed when the facts in this case
are all considered, the contrary is made apparent. Even
though the evidence of the defendant is taken at face
value, no one c.an say how long the so called agreement
should continue, what money or services were to be performed by each of the parties thereto, what money should
be advanced by them, how long should the partnership
exist, what property should it cover, who were to assume and pay the obligations of the undertaking. In
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short a mere oral agreement that persons will become
partners does not constitute such .a contract as the court
can enforce. To do so the court would first be compelled
to make a contract for the partners. That the Court
may not do.
The only contribution the defendant claims to have
made to the operation of the Monteray apartment was
that he did some painting; that he took out the garbage
and watered the lawn and took part in a beautification
association. The defendant testified that the purpose
of the association was to keep out undesirable people
and be.autify the area in which the Monteray apartment
is situated. However, he does not inform us of any
specific accomplishments. (Tr. 139-141). After the
Beezleys moved to the El Vigo apartment, the defendant did nothing towards its care or operation. (Tr.
12-13).
During the period the plaintiff and defendant have
been married, they lived at the home of the plaintiff's
p.arents for about 2% to 3 years. (Tr. 20 and 21). That
from November 1937 until 1945 they lived in the Monteray apartment when they moved into the El Vigo apartment where they resided until this action was brought.
During all that tiine the plaintiff furnished a home for
the defendant without any investment or other expense
to him. In the meanti1ne, the home on Harrison A\e.
and later the property known on 9th South as the El
Dumpo was rented .and the rent used to pay for money
owing for the purchase of those properties. The rents
above all being collected by the defendant. (Tr. 21, 22,
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23 and 27). It will thus be seen that it has been possible
for the Beezleys to acquire and pay for the property
on 9th South known as the El Dumpo because of the fact
that the home in which the plaintiff and defendant have
lived for all of their married life, except the short time
they lived at the Harrison Ave. property, was provided
by the plaintiff.
The defendant at great length went into the various
transactions had with respect to the Harrison Ave.
property, the property on 9th A venue and the property
on 9th South, but nothing was said about the financial
.affairs of the Monteray or El Vigo apartments. He
knew that Mrs. Beezley was keeping books containing
the operation of those apartments, yet during those
many years he did not even inquire about whether the
apartments were being operated at a profit or a loss.
He never reported any income from either of the apartments, yet as .a lawyer he must know that he was required
to do so if he had any interest in those properties. (Tr.
180 to 191). The state federal law requires that partnership returns must be made without regard to whether
or not an income is actually received by the owner of
an interest in .a partnership. See Federal Internal Revenue Code, Chapter 1, Supplement F, Sec. 181 et seq. and
U.C.A.1953, 59-14-21, et seq, also 59-14-43.
The defendant further testified that the partnership was kept a secret because of the dislike of him by
the plaintiff's parents. Obviously if such fact existed
that would be a reason why he would have had it reduced
to writing. Moreover, one of the cardinal principles of
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the law of partnership is that each must exercise towards the other the utmost good faith. It is so provided
in U.C.A. 1953, 48-1-19. It is so held in Sharp v. Sharp,
54 Ut. 262; 180 Pac. 580. See also 40 Am. Jur. 208,
Sec. 113, and numerous cases there cited. If the testimony of the defendant is to be believed it necessarily
follows that he prevailed upon the plaintiff to secure
financial aid from her father in order that the defendant
might have a home in which to live, and if the venture
proved profitable that he may enjoy the profits without sharing any losses if the venture proved a failure.
1Ne have probably extended our argument about
the mythical partnership claimed by the defendant to
have existed between him and the plaintiff longer than
necessary, but we have done so to show that when the
defendant claimed such a contract to exist and that unless plaintiff conveyed one-half of her interest in the El
Vigo .apartment no reconciliation could be had, plaintiff
sustained the mental shock and suffering as testified to
by her.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO DEFENDANT
PLAINTIFF'S ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE 9TH SOUTH
PROPERTY KNOWN AS THE EL DUMPO.

We indicated at the outset that plaintiff concedes
that the court erred in awarding to defendant her onehalf interest in the El Dumpo. To aid defendant in such
claim, it will be noted that no issue is raised by the
pleadings as to that property. Moreover we are not
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familiar with any case in this jurisdiction where the
property is taken from a wife and awarded to the husband. If the husband is in necessitous circumstances it
would seem that under the laws of Utah that may be
done. However, the plaintiff does not resist defendant's
own admission and contention that the court erred in
awarding to the defendant the one-half interest of the
plaintiff in the property on 9th South and that such
error should be corrected. It is submitted that otherwise the decree should be affirmed with costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,

J. GRANT IVERSON
Attorney for Respondent
Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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